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For the Joint Specialist: Five
Steep Hills to Climb
William E. DePuy
This article was first published in the September 1989 issue of Parameters.

O

fficers of the armed forces have been tendered a new and exciting career
opportunity—that of becoming qualified and recognized as a Joint Specialty
Officer. Those who choose to follow this route will be on the leading edge of a
new wave. The opportunity has been fashioned by Congress. It is the product
of long-festering congressional unhappiness about the state of joint affairs
within the Department of Defense. Still beset by concerns over the outcome in
Vietnam, Congress was irritated further by the Mayaguez incident of 19751 and
especially by the failure at Desert One during the Iranian hostage rescue attempt
of 1980. The momentum for reform within Congress was given a mighty twin
boost by the bombing of the Marine barracks at the Beirut airport on 23 October
1983—241 Marines were killed and scores more wounded—followed only two
days later by Urgent Fury, the Grenadan campaign marked by serious problems
of joint execution.
In October 1985, the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee
issued a report2 which became the inspiration for subsequent hearings resulting
ultimately in the now-famous Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of
1986.3 That act represents an astounding and historic intervention by Congress
in the organization and internal operation of the Department of Defense.
Officers who contemplate following the new joint specialist path as
a major career option should read the Senate staff report from cover to cover
in order to understand the perspectives, motives, and objectives of Congress.
The most zealous of such officers may also wish to study the transcripts of the
hearings. The stilted language of the law itself does not convey the spirit and
drive of its intent.
General William E. DePuy, USA Ret., received an ROTC commission in the Infantry
in 1941, following graduation from South Dakota State College. During 1944-45, he
served as a Battalion S3, Regimental S3, and Battalion Commander, all with the 357th
Infantry Regiment, in heavy action against German forces in Europe. He graduated from
the British Imperial Defence College in 1960. During 1964-66, he was the MACV J3 in
Vietnam, and then remained in country to command the 1st Infantry Division until 1967.
After receiving his fourth star in 1973, General DePuy became the first Commanding
General of the Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe, retiring from that
position in 1977. The present article is based upon lectures given by General DePuy at
the Armed Forces Staff College in 1988 and 1989 under the patronage of the Hofheimer
Chair of the National Defense University Foundation.
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The basic theme of the new legislation is to strengthen the joint
establishment vis-à-vis the service departments.4 The most important aspects
are these:
•• The responsibilities and authorities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) are greatly increased. He is now the chief joint military adviser to
the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the entire national security apparatus. He has clear control over the Joint Staff.
•• A four-star Vice Chairman has been provided to assist the Chairman.
•• Minutely detailed instructions are contained in the law regulating the selection, education, assignment, and promotion of the Joint Specialty Officers.5
•• The commanders of the unified commands (the CINCs) have been given
increased authority over the service components of those commands and
direct access to the programming and budgeting processes in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.
•• The service departments have been reorganized to increase civilian control.
With respect to the distribution of power within the national security
apparatus, there is unmistakable presumption of zero-sum game in the package
as a whole. That is, Congress seemed to believe that strengthening the joint
establishment required the weakening of the services. This is both unfortunate
and unnecessary as we shall see. What is required is the strengthening of both.
Thus, Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs), and those who plan to become
such, stand under the influence of this historic legislation, learning the ropes
in respect to the organization, functions, and procedures of the reinforced and
elevated joint establishment. In proceeding, it is wise to remember that it is the
product, not the process, which counts and for which JSOs will be judged in the
long run. The realization of the goals established in the new law and its implementing directives now passes to the hands and talents of a new generation. And
full realization will take just that—generational change.
Let us now turn to five selected opportunities for improvement and
innovation in the joint arena, five steep hills to climb:
•• Raising the quality of joint military advice.
•• Improving the track record in operational art.
•• Determining joint force requirements.
•• Providing joint command and control over joint collateral support operations.
•• Creating the conditions required for the synchronization of cross-service
support at the tactical level.

Hill One: Quality Advice
The government turns to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for military advice
on a very wide range of national security issues and policies. There is no higher
military authority and thus nowhere else to turn for such assistance. When the
Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsive and useful and when the views of the incumbent administration and those of the Joint Chiefs are generally compatible, the
relationship is healthy and productive. When either of these conditions is absent,
there is a pattern of mistrust, rancor, and bad decisions. Therefore, there is much
at stake in these relationships, which are complex at best.
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The environment in which military advice is rendered to the President,
the Secretary of Defense, and the national security apparatus is interesting
in an open democracy. Under the new law, it is the Chairman, JCS, who is
personally responsible for advice to the government and is also responsible for
strategic planning. This suggests the existence of a grand Clausewitzian design
to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff can refer for answers to all the lesser included
questions. It is not quite like that.
In the first place, historically in this pragmatic nation there has been
no true codified national strategy within which the military strategy could
fit as one of several components alongside an economic strategy, a political
strategy, and perhaps social and technological strategies. Congress has been
goading the executive branch to produce such a national strategy, and efforts
have been made.
But the reality remains that the real US strategy consists of the whole
loosely bound portfolio of current security policies dealing with the individual
problems and issues, both foreign and domestic, facing an administration. If a
grand design were to be drafted which projected changes in current policies,
it would have to be so closely held as to be ineffective as an instrument of
government. Current policies are delicately balanced between opposing sets of
pressures. Any prospects for future change announced publicly would produce
a fire storm of contention within our political system and amongst our allies.
And of course real national strategy requires public and congressional support,
so it cannot be closely held. Do not hold your breath for a grand design.
Military strategy is confined by the policies it serves. The real military
strategy, therefore, is the compendium of plans, deployments, operations, and
programs supporting the long list of national security policies, which range
from defense of NATO to the transfer of defense technology and the size of an
advisory group in country X. There is, of course, a necessity to protect actual
military operational plans and to protect from the eyes of our adversaries our
priorities for the distribution of military resources across all the plans. This is
the closest we come to a military strategy.
The business of military advice is booming. Always active whenever a
new administration arrives, we now have the added dimension of the extreme
turbulence generated by Gorbachev’s initiatives, instability in China, and
roiling Middle Eastern scene. And this is not to mention the budget crunch
in the United States and economic trauma in much of the Third World. It is
unlikely that there are any policies not under some kind of review, and the
former planning assumptions associated with a bipolar world are now all up in
the air. Even before the congressional measures to strengthen the joint establishment have taken their full effect, the new system has been plunged into this
maelstrom of activity. That condition may be expected to persist for a long time.
And when policies change—military strategies must follow.
The perspectives of the Congress on JCS performance were down-beat
in 1985 and 1986. In the Senate staff report two comments from former luminaries on the defense scene were quoted as follows:
Former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger: “Advice proffered
by the JCS was generally irrelevant, unread, and largely disregarded.”
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Former Chairman, JCS, General David Jones: “JCS advice was not
crisp, timely, useful, or very influential.”
What this means to the new joint specialist is that the Schlesinger-Jones
assessments of the quality of military advice must be fully turned around—
stood on their head so to speak. In short, military advice must be crisp, timely,
useful, relevant, persuasive, intellectually rigorous, and logically compelling.
That is a tall order. The joint establishment works in a highly competitive
environment not all friendly. The other departments of government and other
philosophies compete for influence and the same shrinking resources. It is not
enough to be convinced of the virtues and rightness of one’s positions. It is also
necessary to win in the fierce competition within the government. We might
add that there is no law which requires a president or his administration to
accept military advice. History tells us that often they do not.
This is the environment into which joint specialists are moving. To
the extent that they are professionally sound, completely candid and clear, and
devoted to the best interests of their country in the broadest sense, they will
have done their duty as the law and the people require.

Hill Two: Operational Art
If military strategy is the compendium of existing plans, then the
quality of the strategy is the sum of the quality of those plans. At the joint level
these are operational plans connected at the top with policy and at the bottom
with the tactical employment of forces.
Recently, there has been great emphasis on operational art throughout
the structure of professional military education. Much of that study has been
devoted to past masters, theorists, and campaigns. That is good, but since the
advent of nuclear weapons and the appearance of limited wars, the criteria for
victory have tended to change. It is wise, therefore, to study our own experiences in the second half of this century from the operational perspective.
The track record is spotty but illuminating. It seems to tell us that success is
defined as the attainment of political objectives in a reasonable time, at bearable cost, and with public support until the end. These criteria have become
the bottom line in our time. Any other outcome equates to failure. Failure is
cruel. It ignores the elegance of tactical performance, the good intentions, and
the devotion and sacrifice of individual members of the armed forces and their
families throughout the country. Failure is corrosive. Success, then, is the business of today’s joint specialist.
Let us review some of our recent military experiences from this perspective and while so doing pay special attention to the baleful consequences
when policy and operations diverge or are otherwise disconnected.
Korea. When President Truman sent our enfeebled armed forces into
Korea in 1950, at least the mission seemed clear—stop the North Koreans and
protect the fledgling government in the South. But the outcome could have gone
either way—as Wellington said after Waterloo, “It was a close run thing.”
General MacArthur’s brilliant operational stroke at Inchon cut the
North Korean line of communications and collapsed the invasion by the
already exhausted and overextended North Korean army encircling Pusan.
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Then General MacArthur sent his forces north in pursuit of a broken enemy.
The debate continues to whether he and his Washington superiors were in any
kind of agreement on policy goals and objectives in respect to the North Korean
government, people, and territory. It seems probable that MacArthur had run
out ahead of Washington thinking—a disconnect which can probably be laid
at the feet of the government, not the commander in the field, who naturally
wished to finish the matter off once and for all.
In any event the Chinese came in, revealing the utter inadequacy of the
policy and the forces available at the time. When MacArthur’s army was back
in the South, very precise policy instructions were issued to confine operations
to the border area with a mission of preserving the political and territorial integrity of the South. The United Nations forces recovered and faithfully executed
the new policy, driving the Chinese and North Koreans back to, and slightly
beyond, the original demarcation.
But with the reins held so tightly, there was no leverage to end the war,
which went on inconclusively at high cost, eventually losing the support of the
people. There was no workable concept for ending the war militarily. Attrition
warfare against China was unappealing. President Eisenhower broke the stalemate with a nuclear threat rendered via India, and we achieved an armistice
which extends to this day. The nuclear option is probably no longer available,
and we should be mindful that wars are easier to start than to stop.
Vietnam. An entirely different kind of war at the beginning, the Vietnam
War came to resemble the Korean War at the end. Starting as a counterinsurgency in the South plus retaliatory air strikes in the North after the Tonkin
Gulf affair in 1964, the war ended with massive bombing in the North and
full-fledged invasion of the South by a North Vietnamese army which threw
five army corps, comprising 17 divisions, at Saigon in 1975.
US policy lagged behind the transitional realities throughout the war.
Even after the North Vietnamese army began to arrive in the South in 1965,
the policy remained one of counterinsurgency and attrition, while the bombing
of the North—prior to the heavy bombing of 1972, which was simply too
late— was used to send admonitory messages to Hanoi rather than to destroy
its warmaking capabilities.
The command in Saigon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff both failed to
persuade the Administration that the North Vietnamese line of communication (the Ho Chi Minh Trail) needed to be cut and that the port of Haiphong
needed to be mined. The Administration considered these measures inconsistent with the nature of the war, which it persisted in viewing as an insurgency.
Washington was also afraid of a Korean-like Chinese intervention—indeed,
Chinese air defense and supply troops were already in North Vietnam.6
So the war went on inconclusively and expensively, and the American
people gradually withdrew their support. The American government was
forced to withdraw its forces from Vietnam in an agonizing failure of both
policy and operations.
Beirut. The mission of the Marines in Beirut in 1983 at the time of
the bombing of their barracks was “peacekeeping.” It was never quite clear
what that meant. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of
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Defense opposed the deployment. There was never an operational plan. The
Marines at the airport were just waiting. This tragic episode counsels us to
beware of vague missions for which no discernible military operational plan
seems relevant. Some say the Marines were a “presence.” The Shiite factions
were not impressed. Vague, exploratory deployments like “showing the flag”
or “presence” are doubly dangerous because they permit incremental, flabby
thinking in Washington. That is, little time or analysis is spent on the possible
consequences of a contemplated action or the next steps to be taken should the
first move prove to be ineffective or even disastrous.
Grenada. This was a success by all of our criteria—it was fast and
relatively inexpensive, and the public had no time in which to become disaffected. On the other hand, execution was ragged. We seem to have a problem
in organizing, training, and equipping joint headquarters before they are
needed. They are therefore not always fully prepared for the complexities of
modern joint operations. It is a problem worthy of the joint specialist’s most
urgent attention.
Persian Gulf. The tanker escort mission was well done—no disconnects between policy and operations (with the exception of the Iranian airbus
shoot-down which was a tragic mistake)—and the means were adequate to the
ends. However, let us suppose, hypothetically, that we had gone into Iran in
pursuit of Silkworm missiles or earlier in accordance with the Carter doctrine.
Would we have set ourselves up for the same dilemma that plagued us in
Korea and Vietnam? If we had prosecuted a vigorous war against Iran, would
it have brought in the Soviet Union directly or indirectly? And if we had held
operations below the threshold of Soviet provocation, how would we ever have
ended the war? The study of neither Clausewitz nor Napoleon reveals easy
answers to this dimension of operational art in an era of limited wars and
nuclear deterrence. It seems to be the classic operational trap of the last half of
the 20th century. True, things went well with the Air Force and Navy’s punitive
airstrikes against Tripoli in 1986, when the means seemed to fit the ends. But
the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and Noriega in Panama present us with different
but no less vexing dilemmas as we approach the 1990s.

Hill Three: Joint Force Requirements
Disturbed by the service-centered promotion of the 600-ship Navy,
the Army’s light divisions, and the Air Force plan to substitute F-16s for the
aging A-10s as the preferred close air support platform, Congress wants force
requirements to be derived in the future from the war plans of the combatant
commanders—the CINCs.
However, it is not that simple. There are four essential participants in
this centrally important function. The resource availabilities are set forth by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic
plans and direction; the CINCs draw up the war plans; and the services develop
the forces.
None of these functions is transferable. No one but the Navy can organize,
train, and equip carrier battle groups; the Army—corps and divisions; the Air
Force—wings and squadrons; and the Marines—amphibious forces. The force
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development process is therefore circular, iterative, interactive, and complex.
It represents a vast sharing of responsibility across several huge bureaucratic
institutions. It does no good to simplify it on paper. It won’t simplify.
The pendulum of influence should swing toward the joint establishment, but not too far. Congress doesn’t seem fully aware of the seminal
contribution of the services in combining technology and tactics within fighting organizations and in training individuals and units up to high performance
in the employment of those forces.
To some extent the shift from service dominance to joint participation
is a cultural process. It may also be generational. That points to the emergence
of the joint specialist.

Hill Four: Joint Control of Collateral Operations
In 1944, the Allies conducted a collateral deception operation which
kept the German 15th Army pinned in the area of Calais waiting for the “real”
invasion. Even after seven weeks of combat in Normandy, the Germans kept
one eye on the Pas de Calais. Had it been otherwise the invasion might not have
prospered. The deception operation was run directly out of the headquarters of
the Supreme Allied Commander. In 1985, the Israelis wished to invade Lebanon
to force out the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). But the Syrian air
defenses would have made it difficult to provide adequate air support to the
Israeli army. After performing a protracted joint intelligence operation, which
mapped the Syrian air defenses down to precise locations and communications links, nodes, and frequencies, the Israelis conducted a preliminary set
of collateral operations. Drones activated the defenses; aircraft, artillery, and
electronic warfare measures attacked the system simultaneously; fighters shot
down the reacting Syrian air force; and commandos knocked out the central
control headquarters. Then, and only then, did the Israeli army begin to roll.
This preliminary set of collateral operations was controlled by the chief of staff
of the Israeli air force.
It seems certain that US joint commanders will wish to conduct similar
collateral operations at their level in support of their joint concepts of operations. Over time, they might include any or all of the following candidates: joint
intelligence; joint deception; joint command, control, and communications
countermeasures; joint suppression of enemy air defenses; joint special operations; joint counterfire; joint regional air defense; joint special logistics; joint
deep attack (Follow-On Forces Attack [FOFA]); and others.
Each requires a commander, a concept of operations, a task organization, specified command relationships, and a qualified and seasoned joint staff.
At the present time, only special operations have such staffs and headquarters.
For the others there are none, and in most cases such command arrangements
have not even been conceptualized. This is exactly the kind of problem the joint
specialist will wish to take on.
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Hill Five: Synchronizing Cross-Service Support to the Tactical Level
The several armed services are specialized around the mediums in
which they operate—land, sea, air, space, etc. But some of their specialties are
also required by the other services. The organizational dilemma has always been
whether to duplicate functions or share them. Sharing is the heart of jointness.
The Army has always been the leading proponent of jointness—not
because it is more earnest or altruistic, but because it is massively dependent
upon the other services. The Army can neither deploy nor fight exclusively with
its own resources. In fact, there is cross-service involvement in every single
Army combat and support function.
The Army deploys by air or sea. Army intelligence operations depend
upon cross-service surveillance, reconnaissance, electronic intelligence, target
acquisition, and help in intelligence fusion. Fire support always includes close
air support and battlefield air interdiction—and sometimes naval gunfire
support. Tactical maneuver may involve airborne or amphibious operations
which depend upon Air Force or Navy support. Army and Air Force electronic warfare efforts are joint. Joint air defense is commanded by an Air Force
officer. The Army depends constantly on air and sea lines and communication,
including air delivery to forward units of critical munitions and repair parts.
The Army in the field is a joint force.
The Joint Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar System (JSTARS)
is simply an extreme example. JSTARS, which is operated by the Air Force, is
to the Army what the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) is to
the Air Force itself. By locating and tracking the movement of enemy ground
forces, JSTARS provides the real-time information required by corps, division,
and brigade commanders to maneuver their forces and target the enemy. It is
therefore at the heart of Army tactical operations. It is not just nice to have—it
is indispensable.7
On the basis of JSTARs information, the Army corps, division, and
brigade commanders rapidly develop their concepts of operations, which
key all the battlefield functions to the support of maneuver. This is the way a
commander concentrates combat power against the enemy in decisive bursts
of intensity to win battles. Obviously, this process of synchronization must
embrace the now integrated and essential cross-service support. Seizing the
initiative in battle requires not only precision, but also very rapid synchronization. For this purpose command relationships must be tight, effective, and
thoroughly understood. There is a certain looseness in the system today which
can and should be tightened up. The term support is the key. It is not sensible
to even think about attaching elements of the fleet to an Army corps for naval
gunfire support nor extending the command authority of an Army division
commander over the air bases from which his close air support is launched. But
at the same time, it is no longer tolerable to even think about withdrawing the
Air Force JSTARS from support of an Army corps in action.
The modalities of support developed over the last century which regulate the command relationship between artillery and maneuver within the Army
may have broader application to these increasingly intimate and time-sensitive
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cross-service relationships. For example, JSTARS sorties could be placed in
direct support of a corps—meaning they would not be withdrawn except in
the most extreme and unusual emergencies. The divisions and brigades would
receive a continuous stream of information on the location and movement of
enemy forces. And yet JSTARS would remain unequivocally under Air Force
command and control.
Close air support and battlefield air interdiction could be placed in
general support, reinforcing the fire support of a particular corps but not necessarily in support of each division at all times. It would continue to operate within
the Air Force tactical air command and control system. Deep air interdiction
could be placed in general support of the Army group or joint task force.
These modest adjustments to command relationships across service
lines in the tactical arena might be beneficial and clarifying. They give a richer
meaning to the term support. Just leaving everything up to the day-by-day
or even minute-by-minute determination of a remote joint commander—the
current practice—is not conducive to fast, effective synchronization of joint
combat power and is not consistent with the degree of cross-service dependency which has arisen over the years.

Concluding Thought
How far the impetus of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation will carry the
joint specialist up these five hills and many others only time will tell. We may
find there are natural limits to the scope and utility of tactical jointness. But we
most certainly have not even closely approached them thus far. Over the years
ahead, the Joint Specialty Officer will need to introduce many changes in the
joint establishment and in how it operates. He will bring a fresh generational
viewpoint to the task, and that is exactly what is now needed.
Notes
1. On 14 May 1975, 250 US Marines were landed on Koh Tang Island off the coast of Cambodia
to rescue the 39 crew members of the SS Mayaguez, which had been seized along with its crew by
a Cambodian gunboat. It turned out that the crew was not on the island chosen for assault, and the
Marines, who encountered heavy Cambodian resistance, themselves had to be evacuated under fire.
The operation resulted in 38 US dead, 50 wounded, and 3 missing. Although the Mayaguez itself was
recaptured, the Cambodian government had already announced the release of the ship and crew when
the attack began. See John E. Jessup, A Chronology of Conflict and Resolution, 1945-1985 (New
York: Greenwood Press, 1989), p. 534.
2. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Staff Report, “Defense Reorganization:
The Need for Change” (Washington: GPO, October 1985).
3. Public Law 99-433.
4. For an excellent discussion of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, see Don M. Snider, “DOD
Reorganization: Part I, New Imperatives,” Parameters, 17 (September 1987), 88-100; and “DOD
Reorganization: Part II, New Opportunities,” Parameters, 17 (December 1987), 49-58. The joint
specialty for officers is discussed in Part I, pp. 94-96.
5. Pursuant to the Godlwater-Nichols legislation, the Secretary of Defense was to determine the
number of joint duty positions within the defense establishment. The presently determined figure is
8,300 (Rick Maze, “Services Blasted Again for Handling of Joint-Duty Posts,” Army Times, 29 May
1989, p. 4). The Secretary is required to designate 1,000 of these slots as “critical,” meaning they must
be filled with a JSO. The law further states that approximately half of the joint duty positions must at
any one time be filled with an officer who is or has been nominated as a JSO, with this half including the 1,000 “critical” JSO-required slots. To educate JSOs, the Skeleton Panel has recommended
a two-phase process. Phase I would be taught at the intermediate or senior service colleges; Phase II

80Parameters

For the Joint Specialist: Five Steep Hills to Climb
would be presented in a TDY status at the Armed Forces Staff College, following graduation from the
intermediate or senior service colleges, to JSO-nominees en route to a joint-duty assignment (see US
Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Panel on Military Education, 101st
Cong., 1st sess., Committee Print 4 [Washington: GPO, 1989], pp. 3-4 and chap. III).
6. See “China Admits Combat in Vietnam War,” The Washington Post, 17 May 1989, p. A31.
7. For the details of JSTARs, see Robert S. Dudney, “The Battle Vision of Joint STARS,” Air
Force, June 1989, pp. 42-45.
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